The paper presents some (admittedly preliminary) results on evolutionary modeling of open-economies interactions. The dynamics is microfounded in a multiplicity of boundedly rational agents who imperfectly learn how to innovate in environments characterized by notionally unlimited opportunities. Micro discoveries-/'/ is shown-can generate persistent system-level effects. Despite the absence in the model of any institutional specificity of individual countries, processes of innovative exploration and imitation yield international divergence, (less often) convergence, catching-up, and falling-bebind. 
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1. Introduction jj Are firm-specific activities of innovation sufficient to determine long-term , 1 country-level differentiation in the patterns of growth? Do the time series of the aggregate variables generated by evolutionary processes of learning and | selection display statistical properties similar to the observed ones? Can one > account also for convergence and divergence, forging ahead and falling & behind in per capita incomes? <-> The model that follows addresses these questions and explores the prop-| erties of evolutionary microfoundations of growth in open economies which <-> continuously undergo innovation and imitation by heterogeneous agents. As This model tries to move some steps in this direction by microfounding country dynamics on some stylized company-specific processes of innovation and imitation.
We start from the Schumpeterian intuition that technical change is in its nature a disequilibrium phenomenon and we focus on the aggregate properties of economies where innovative learning is such that they are never able to reach a state wherein resources are allocated optimally and prices reveal relative efficiencies of inputs. In fact, we shall make our argument even more extreme and suppose that each economic system is never constrained by scarcities either in terms of notional technological opportunities or in terms of labour supply. Moreover, we shall neglect all those countryspecific systematic influences, such as institutional specificities, policies, etc. which-one has argued in the introduction to this volume-exert a paramount influence on development patterns. Under these extreme circumstances, we shall ask, will each system self-organize through fluctuations far from equilibrium and generate some of those regularities which we empirically observe? (Of course, a positive result would only be reinforced by adding those country-specific factors mentioned above.)
More specifically, we shall show that:
(i) Initially identical countries may well differentiate in ways that are persistent over time, (ii) 'Local' (company-specific) fluctuations may determine long-term aggregate (country-wide) effects, (iii) 'Evolutionary' microfoundations and heterogeneous learning are sufficient to sustain Kaldorian 'virtuous' and 'vicious' feedbacks, (iv) According to different time-scales and different 'phases' one may observe 'catching up', forging ahead, divergence. 226
The modeling strategy finds a lot of inspiration in the seminal work of Nelson and Winter (1982) and draws from a previous (closed-economy) model by one of us (Chiaromonte and Dosi, 1992 Labor is the only input in both search and production and by assumption there are no constraints in its supply. In the version of the model presented here for simplicity labor is homogeneous and can be applied indifferently to search and production. (Fixed) coefficients of production are companyspecific, I/TT,//), where 1T is labor productivity.
Search and Imitation
'Search' is a two-stages stochastic process and applies to both innovation and imitation.
A first stage determines whether search is successful:
where I tJ is a binary variable which takes value one if the event 'success' occurs, INy is the investment in search by firm ;' of country j measured in terms of a current and lagged number of searching workers (Inn): 2 In another version of the model, not presented here, we have a learning externality, so that the probability of innovation depends also on the amount of search undertaken by all others firms within the country and in the world: 
Xlnn o (t-J)
The parameter a\ captures the level of technological opportunities. If'success' is drawn, the firm adds a percentage productivity increment by accessing a Poisson distribution with mean \:
The value of \, too, is a proxy for the richness of unexplored opportunities. Technological knowledge, in our model, is neither a purely public good nor is perfectly appropriable. New techniques can be imitated but with a search cost. In analogy with innovation, imitation is a two stages stochastic process, dependent also on the 'technological gap' vis-a-vis the imitated technique.
Define the notional set of techniques that can be imitated as II(/) = [/"" i irfi). Next, define the differences (that is the 'distance') between the technique already used by firm /' and any one technique belonging to II: where £ ( > 1), so to speak, decreases the imitability of the techniques belonging to firms of other countries. Hence, the imitation search set for the /'-firm is defined by:
UM 0 (/) = {V ir e n : d(ir,yW,ir) > 0}.
Like the innovation process, success in imitation is a stochastic variable
where, denoting the numbers of workers involved in imitative search at time / by lmi(i),
The parameter <*2/ is an inverse measure of appropriability, while a 3) and 0:4, capture country-wide and worldwide externalities, respectively. (In the simulations that we shall present below we shall put <* 3J and a^y equal to zero.) In the case of'imitative success', the imitated technique is drawn from the imitation search set with a probability proportional to the distance from the technique currently used by firm /, V TT e TlMjfi): 228
The intuition behind this formulation is that learning is 'local' and knowledge is partly tacit, so that the probability of instantaneous catching up to best practice techniques is inversely proportional to the laggard's distance (although, of course, the scope for catching up is higher). The rule determining the technique actually applied to production is straightforward:
Behavioural Rules
In the model, we make the rather extreme and unorthodox assumption that behavior is totally 'routinized', that is, based on fixed and event-independent rules. There are indeed good empirical and theoretical reasons to expect behaviors to be rather inertial in highly uncertain and non-stationary environments (see Nelson and Winter, 1982; Heiner, 1988; Dosi and Egidi, 1991) in addition, of course, to the 'behaviorist tradition' of Herbert Simon and James March). In any case, the reader who is more inclined to 'rational' characterizations of microbehaviors may well consider this assumption as an extreme version of bounded rationality with myopic expectations.
A first routine determines the quantity of investment in research by relating it to the firm's previous-period turnover:
The number of workers in research is defined by:
where wff) is the wage in country j at /. Another rule divides research activity between innovation, /»»,y and imitation, Imijj
The determination of the price within each firm is based on a two-stages process. First, the 'desired' price, p ip is calculated on the basis of a mark-up procedure, in relation to the wage level in the current and the previous period and the firm's productivity coefficient:
where m is the mark-up coefficient and a^, and <* 5 , are coefficients of adjustment (<*4, + tf 5/ = 1).
In the second stage, the actual price variation by each firm on its own domestic market is computed as:
where f*(t) is the desired market share of firm / (for simplicity here and throughout we drop the suffices whenever that does not engender confusion).
(As it will be described in more detail in what follows, firms may happen to be in a situation of 'credit rationing'. In such cases, the actual market share, /.( ) is different from the desired one.) Therefore, the actual price becomes:
The process of change of individual productivities jointly with the pricing procedure determine the level of firm-specific 'competitiveness', £,y. A procedure of price variation similar to that described in equations (11) and (12) is applied for pricing in markets different from one's own domestic market. Clearly, in these circumstances, the p,/,t)'s are redefined with the current exchange rate in order to yield the desired and actual prices in local currencies. Thus, prices and exchange rates enter the determination of the competitiveness of each firm in each market:
where p y is the exchange rate of country j and k is the particular market where the firm operates. Workers consume in (/ + 1) all the wages that they have earned in t. Firms invest their surpluses in search via the mechanism of equation (6) and deposit their net cash flow in an interest-free account with the 'financial sector' which 230
is not modeled here. Or they can draw interest-free advances up to a limit proportional to their current turnover and past cash flows. This is like saying that credit is rationed for individual firms and may constrain individual growth. Note that, on the contrary, there is no aggregate ceiling to credit. That is, one may think of an endogenous money supply: the assumption is near the Kaldorian idea of'endogenous money'. Call C,ff) the net cash flows. The (credit-constrained) maximum growth of a firm is:
Domestic demand in each country (at current prices and exchange rates), D>, aggregates ex post over the whole wage bill paid to workers employed in both production and search:
where N v is the total employment in firm /'. In this version of the model we also assume a constant-share demand function. For country/', we have:
(Af is the number of sectors). Demand is distributed among individual producers (both domestic and foreign) according to their relative competitiveness. Demand can be thought of as 'orders' on the basis of which each firm determines its production decisions, according to the relation:
That is, the demand of firm / which produces in country/ is the sum of the demands from all the national markets, k (in sector h where it operates), translated into its domestic currency via the exchange rate. In turn, the demand in each market is obviously identical to its market share, /., multiplied by the size of the market itself, D\ Market share dynamics in each market is governed by:
where £* (/) is the average competitiveness on market k and the coefficient a n is a proxy for the 'selectiveness' of the market. Loosely speaking, it determines the speed at which success is rewarded and lags are punished. This replicator type dynamics associated with market selection entails, in general, the coexistence of firms characterized by different levels of efficiency and different behavioral rules.
3
Firms die when their market shares are reduced below a certain critical level:~*
J ij /mm-
The model also embodies entry of new firms. Dead firms are replaced by new entrants with an initial productivity equal to the average productivity in the sector and in the country where birth occurs, plus a white noise. Demand for labor to be employed in production by firm /' is:
That is, it is just the real output divided by labor productivity of the firm.
Aggregate Dynamics and National Accounts National aggregate variables sum up (very much like national accounts) over their corresponding microeconomic values. National income, at constant prices (Y*) is:
Exports are:
where we consider the market shares of firm /' belonging to country j on each of the other k markets different from j (i.e. sales of domestic firms in every country different from their own).
Imports are:
That is, imports are obviously the total domestic demand minus the domestic sales from domestic firms.
Trade balances (which in this model are taken to be identical to foreign payment balances) are:
The (monetary) wage dynamic is driven by labor productivity growth Off,), percentage consumer price changes $,), and percentage changes in the levels of employment
The variable pj stands for a consumer price index; Tf } is the average productivity across the M sectors weighted with the real product of each firm and the dots stand for rates of change. The coefficients are bounded in the interval {0,1}. Exchange rates vary as a function of current and past cumulated foreign balances.
4
Before discussing the simulation results, let us consider some general properties of this model. First, note that dynamics is driven by endogenously generated, company-specific technological shocks but the latter exert their influence on incomes via a 'Keynesian' mechanism of demand formation.
Second, the propagation of these shocks occurs via (i) imperfect adjustments on the product markets, through changes in market shares; and (ii) inter-firm imitation. This also implies, of course, that diffusion of innovation is never instantaneous and its rates depend jointly on market selection among heterogeneous firms and, in inverse fashion, on the appropriability of innovations. Further, financial market rationing may put a ceiling on the expansion of the most successful firms. Third, the model embodies different sources of persistence: at company- level, (i) probabilities of innovation and imitation depend also on lagged expenditures in search; (ii) innovative success feeds on itself by increasing the amount of resources devoted to search in the future; and, of course, (iii) the dynamics of firm-specific levels of productivity implies a non-dissipating memory (indeed, productivity for the single firm displays a behavior like a random walk with drift). Fourth, imitation plus market selection introduces non-linear processes of interactions among firms. Moreover, adjustments in wages and exchange rates can be considered as some sort of negative feedbacks which curb, at least to some extent, the ability of firms to expand indefinitely on the world market.
Fifth, the fact that new-born firms access on average the mean efficiency of the incumbent in the sector and country where they start up implies some sort of country-specific externality which contributes to differentiate national knowledge basis.
Finally, note also a few things that are missing in this model, although they are plausibly very important in reality and also crucial in determining the observed cross-sectional and time series regularities in incomes. There is no fixed investment and thus the model rules out all those sources of irreversibility associated with capital-embodied technical change and vintages effects (cf. Silverberg and Lehnert, 1992; Silverberg and Verspagen, this volume) . There is no room for expectations formation and thus for the amplifying or dampening effects that they might exert vis-a-vis past dynamics and there is also no room for those general factors-i.e. education, levels and composition of investments, etc.-which, as argued in the introduction, have a paramount importance in development. Under these circumstances, one of the crucial questions is precisely whether firm-specific sources of persistence are sufficient to explain country-level differentiation, with persistent diversity in the levels and growth rates of incomes.
Some Simulation Results
Let us start by emphasizing that what we report in the following are highly preliminary results, which nonetheless suggest in our view the heuristic promises of evolutionary microfbundations of international growth and, together, of the time series properties of growth patterns.
The analytical strategy with the simulation exercises is to explore the major regularities which the model generates as emergent properties, that is, as aggregate outcomes of the thread of positive and negative feedback mechanisms embedded in the behaviors and interactions of micro units. We 234 have experimented with a few different parametrizations: the results that we shall present appear to be robust to rather wide parameter variations. A general feature of the model is that it reproduces persistent inter-firm asymmetries in productivities, profits and market shares, which certainly fit the microeconomic 'stylized facts' discussed in Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (this volume) .
In the simulations, we start by analyzing the time series properties in the closed economy case. The economy is composed of five sectors of production interacting with each other in terms of creation and distribution of the aggregate demand. Each sector is made of 100 initially identical firms.
5
Concerning the aggregate properties of the generated time series, we have analyzed the dynamic behavior of income, prices, investment, employment, productivity and per capita income. In particular, testing for stationarity, these series appear to be non-stationary in the levels and frequently stationary in the first differences 6 and, therefore, appear to be integrated of order one. Moreover, we have found mixed evidence concerning the presence of cointegrating vectors between income and each of the other variables. Cointegration seems to be highly sensitive to the different parametrizations. Next, we experimented with a simplified version of the multicountry case. We considered as a starting point a homogeneous world economy in a stationary equilibrium: all firms and all countries are identical, foreign account balances and all exchange rates are equal to one. In order to minimize any in-built bias toward differentiation, we have not allowed any country-wide externalities and we have assumed that the adjustment parameters (on the labor and product markets) and the behavioral parameters (e.g. mark-ups, propensity to invest in innovation, etc.) are identical across firms and across countries. ated by the model are beyond the scope of this paper. However, let us just mention that persistence in shock propagation appears to be a general outcome.
10
Clearly, the observer of the time series unaware of the process which generated them could easily interpret the strong trend component as the outcome of an exogenous technical progress (as in Solow-type production functions). However, it follows from the structure of the model outlined above that if anything this is an important aggregate property emerging from endogenous technical changes cum heterogeneous agents and far from equilibrium diffusion. This very structure yields also a very high persistence, without exogenously imposing autocorrelation in the shocks. (Note also our 'shocks' are firm-specific.)
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More central to the argument of this paper is the long-term convergence/ divergence in per capita incomes. The experiment we show concerns a 'world' economy with two sectors and 55 countries. The evolutionary model generates increasing differentiation in both levels and rates of growth of per capita incomes: Figure 3 (the P is significant at 5% level).
10 Standard autocorrelation measures cannot always be applied to the first differences of the time teries lince they often appear to be distributed normally only for (relatively long) subperiods but not over the whole 'hutory' of the country. Note that this property is not necessarily a drawback of the model. Loosely speaking, the model generates in many cases a 'take off process driving a country from near stagnation to sustained rates of growth or, conversely, 'vicious circles' from the latter persistent decline. As a consequence, for the statistical observer, the stochastic process describing growth undergoes a relatively sudden modification.
" It is also worth stressing that these bask properties hold for rather different 'technological opportunities' (we have experimented for different values of the X in the Poiison distribution, between 4 and 16). Of course, one can always explicitly introduce a 'post-selection bias' and test for the subgroups which turn out at the end to be 'developed' and 'undeveloped'. In the former case (same period, top 25 countries) we obtain a negative (-0.59) but statistically insignificant (} coefficient (/-ratio: -0.23; tf 5 = -0.04). For the bottom 20 countries $ is positive (1.80) and highly significant {t: 3-06; R 2 = 0.31). If one were to infer some patterns from these estimates it is the relative weakness of systematic forces leading to convergence and, at the opposite side, the tendency of some countries to 'selforganize' in vicious circles of backwardness. The dynamics of imports and exports are, in this model, the ex post outcome of sector specific international competition together with countrywide adjustments which in turn affect the competitiveness of single firms. tion and selection. In some countries this process leads to specialization. Some other time, the dynamics of absolute advantages/disadvantages is similar across sectors (with an increasing technology gap rather homogeneous across the two sectors, see Figures 5 and 6 ).
the cyclical and long-term behavior of aggregate time series; convergence and (more often) divergence in rates of innovation, diffusion, income levels and income growth; the endogenous emergence of absolute and comparative advantages. The story which the model tells is basically one of processes with no 'ingredients' or 'factors' to begin with: if anything, what at a certain point of the sequence appear to be such, are in fact the endogenous results of past self-organization processes. The two twin driving forces are learning and market selection. We would like to consider this model as a sort of example of evolutionary microfoundation consistent, at least in principle, with other more structured, more aggregate and not necessarily microfounded analyses. For example, we suggest, an evolutionary microstructure is certainly consistent and complementary with the intuitions which inspired a lot of the developments in growth theory regarding country-specific characteristics and institutions, threshold effects, externalities. We suggest that these properties are, if anything, magnified whenever one does not superimpose or incorporate them within the standard micro scaffolding. Linking the current model with institutional'richer analysis clearly would imply, among other things, some endogenization of behavioral rules, an explicit formalization of the effect of national characteristics such as education on search and production skill and differentiation among the regimes of governants of national markets. All this is beyond the aims of this work but certainly not unfeasible and indeed a promising frontier ahead.
Moreover, the emphasis on learning-decoupled from optimal allocation processes-is a common element between evolutionary models and models of Kaldorian inspiration. For example, it is easy to imagine co-evolutionary processes of innovation and capital accumulation (or lack of them), leading to self-reinforcing divergent patterns of development, which might rest on microfoundations of the kind outlined above. In a similar vein, one can conjecture fruitful links with models of cumulative divergence and catching up (see in particular, for non-linear formulations, Verspagen, 1991; Amable, 1992; and with respect to trade, Cimoli, 1988) and with growth models which derive the long-term properties of the economy from some general assumptions on the nature of learning and of innovation-embodying capital accumulation (like Pasinetti, 1982; Moss, 1990 and earlier, of course, Kaldor and development analysts such as Hirschman, Gerschenkron, Rosenstein-Rodan).
All this, of course, entails a rich research agenda; it overlaps with a few equilibrium-cum-rationality agendas (cf. new growth theories) in the thrust to place knowledge, innovation, increasing returns at the center of growth theory but it departs from them first of all in the assumptions about how 240 agents behave, how learning takes place and how markets work. Putting it somewhat loosely, evolutionary approaches focus on the analysis of what in standard production functions is the A(i) dynamics and, further, claim that this is sufficient to incorporate also all the microeconomic action without invoking any underlying general equilibrium. Also, the nature of 'explanation' and 'testing' is different between evolutionary and more standard growth models. The latter aim at 'explaining' by developing and testing particular formulations of and restrictions on the production function (the basic micro assumption underlying the production function itself being shielded from refutation). Conversely, evolutionary theories are often 'tested' (i) by comparing some statistical properties of the simulation they generate with those of observed data, and (ii) by mapping specific processes (e.g. on learning and market dynamics) into some relatively invariant aggregate outcomes (e.g. patterns of income growth, etc.).
